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In this essay I will reflect on the three cases decided by the 
Supreme Court in the new millennium.  Of course, there is 
nothing sacrosanct about the year 2001, except that there was an 
overblown scare about the breakdown of our computerized world.  
That said, the three copyright cases decided in or after 2001 do 
provide a picture, albeit somewhat blurred, of where the Court 
stands on copyright issues.  Three cases, obviously, do not 
constitute an enormous amount of empirical data, so I can only 
posit tentative conclusions about where the Court is going and 
what these decisions might mean for the future of copyright law. 
On the whole, as I reflect on this rather limited Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, I fail to conclusively find a unifying theme.  I 
would prefer to speak of certain tendencies, which may or may not 
come to full fruition in the future.  What I see in reviewing Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 1 New York Times Co. v. Tasini,2 and Dastar v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp.3 is a Court that rejects a clear-cut normative 
vision in favor of what one might characterize as a jurisprudence of 
 
†    Distinguished Scholar in Intellectual Property Law and University Fellow 
at Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.  B.A. and J.D. University of 
Texas; M.A. University of Illinois, LL.M. New York University. 
 1. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 2. 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 3. 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003). 
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deference, a conservative orientation rather than an exercise of 
some form of judicial activism.  Relative unanimity rules the day 
among members of the Court as exemplified by Eldred and Tasini in 
their 7-2 opinions, finding Stevens and Breyer the dissenters in 
each.4  It is a court that has reconfirmed the traditional contours of 
copyright, one that recognizes the delicate balance between the 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner and exceptions and 
limitations on that property right. In this regard, certain public 
domain advocates, who were sorely disappointed after the Court 
upheld the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, may be pleasantly surprised if and when the Court is asked 
to accommodate digital issues within the traditional confines of 
copyright.  I will return to this issue throughout this essay. 
In reviewing these cases, I reveal my own particular bias in 
constitutional interpretation, which avoids a structured formalist or 
originalist interpretation.  Instead, I favor a more generalized 
pragmatic, instrumentalist approach to the law and believe that the 
ultimate goal of any constitutional jurisprudence is the 
enhancement of social welfare, an important aspect of which is 
consumer welfare, as defined from an economic standpoint.  Of 
course, this jurisprudence should always be constrained by the 
language of statutes and the intent of Congress, particularly when 
that intent unambiguously flows from the statutory provision.  
However, statutes and constitutional provisions must be interpreted 
flexibly in order to make them speak intelligently to circumstances 
sometimes not envisaged by their drafters.  In other words, the law 
is not grounded in permanent principles and realized in logical 
manipulation of these principles. 
As for my own view on the three cases at issue, I find the 
decisions to be sensible from a jurisprudential standpoint, although 
I might find fault with the rationale of Dastar, rather than its 
holding.  I might disagree with the policy behind the CTEA, but 
not the Eldred decision.  Likewise, I am not happy with the 
immediate societal effect of the Court’s Tasini decision, but I think 
the Court properly interpreted the statute.  I will begin with the 
most talked about Supreme Court case affecting copyright law, 
which is, of course, Eldred, decided on January 15, 2003. 
 
 4. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 223, 242; Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506. 
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I. ELDRED V. ASHCROFT: DEFERENCE AND HUMILITY 
Eldred v. Ashcroft5 is a significant case because it represents the 
first direct challenge to the constitutionality of any portion of 
federal copyright legislation to reach the Court since the first 
statute became law in 1790.  The fact that the Court decided to 
hear the case on certiorari, after it was lost on both the district level 
and on appeal, was a high point for public domain advocates. 
The law was an impediment to Eric Eldred, who had hoped to 
post a number of 1923 works on the Internet upon expiration of 
their copyrights in 1999.6  The passage of the CTEA extended by 
twenty years the copyright term for existing copyrights, pushing the 
copyright expiration on these works to 2019.7  Eldred’s primary 
argument was that the CTEA did not “promote science and useful 
arts” as required by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United 
States Constitution.8  Rather the law was simply a windfall to owners 
of existing copyrights, and neither encouraged the creation of new 
works nor provided any other benefit to the public.9  Moreover, the 
statute was said to violate Article I because an extension of existing 
copyright terms would exceed congressional power to grant 
copyright for “limited times.”10  Eldred also asserted a violation of 
the First Amendment claiming that the CTEA was a content-neutral 
regulation of speech that could be upheld only if it satisfied a 
heightened level of judicial scrutiny.11  Both the district court and 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit summarily 
rejected these arguments.12 
To the surprise of many, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in February 2002.13  The case soon became front-page news around 
the world and generated an unusually large number of amici briefs.  
By a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the CTEA that prolonged 
the duration of existing and future copyrights for another twenty 
years.14  As a result of the decision, the term of copyright for 
individual authors was extended to the life of the author plus 
 
 5. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 6. Joint Appendix at 13aa, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 2002 WL 32102971 (2002). 
 7. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 195. 
 8. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 10, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 34092017 (2001). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 17. 
 12. Id. at 3-4. 
 13. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002). 
 14. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003). 
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seventy years for works created on or after January 1, 1978.15  For 
works first published before that date, the term is ninety-five years 
from the date of first publication.16  Although the Supreme Court 
decided against Eldred on both the Article I and First Amendment 
issues, the Court’s rationale is worthy of attention for its possible 
effect on future cases.  I will begin by discussing the Article I issue 
and then proceed to the First Amendment issue, which I believe 
may prove to be the more significant issue in the future 
development of copyright law. 
 
A.  The Article I Issue: Did the Extension Promote Progress? 
 
One intriguing question was whether the Court would assume 
the activist role that it took in federalist cases17 or take the more 
deferential position that it has applied to commercial legislation.  
Of course petitioners hoped that the Court would adopt its anti-
federalist role; in that case, the CTEA would be in serious difficulty.  
At oral argument, when I heard Chief Justice Rehnquist speak with 
enthusiasm about the expansive nature of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power, however, petitioner’s position was obviously in 
jeopardy. 
In deciding that Congress could apply a copyright extension to 
existing copyrights, the Court acknowledged the influence of “an 
unbroken congressional practice of granting to authors of works 
with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions”18 holding 
that “[s]uch consistent congressional practice is entitled to ‘very 
great weight . . . .’ ”19  This attitude is grounded on a basic principle 
of constitutional interpretation.  When Congress passes a law there 
is an implicit congressional judgment that the statute is within 
Congress’s constitutional power.20  Thus, the constitutional beliefs 
 
 15. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). 
 16. Id. § 302(e).  For works created before January 1, 1978 but not published 
or copyrighted, the term of copyright “subsists from January 1, 1978, and endures 
for the term provided by section 302.”  Id. at § 303(a). 
 17. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 640-41 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S 44 (1996). 
 18. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 188. 
 19. Id. at 213. 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 (1990) 
(“Because Congress is bound by the Constitution, its enactment of any law is 
predicated at least implicitly on a judgment that the law is constitutional.”). 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 5 [2004], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss5/1
LEAFFER-FORMATTED 7/20/2004  6:22:54 PM 
2004] LIFE AFTER ELDRED 1601 
of Congress are a basic source for judicially constructed 
constitutional law. 
Indeed, even upon the most cursory reading, one is struck with 
the language of an opinion permeated with the rhetoric of 
deference.  Having determined that the CTEA does not violate the 
“limited Times” prescription of the “Copyright Clause,” the Court 
goes on to state that “we defer substantially to Congress” on this 
constitutional question.21  “[W]e are not at liberty to second-guess 
congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, 
however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”22  I surmised 
that the petitioners may have been in trouble when Justice 
O’Conner posed to the petitioners’ counsel, Lawrence Lessig, that 
perhaps the term extension was bad policy, but was it 
unconstitutional?23  Indeed, the majority stated that the CTEA 
“reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments 
the Court cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s domain.”24  
Thus, deference to Congress is appropriate in this instance because 
the kinds of judgments necessary to apply the relevant 
constitutional rule either are better made by Congress or are 
beyond the institutional competence of the Court.25  In the end, 
the Court’s position markedly contrasts its cases based on 
Congress’s power to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity.  Instead, 
the majority viewed the CTEA as another form of commercial 
legislation. 
I do not find the Court’s decision to defer to Congress’s 
authority to make policy and opt for the status quo particularly 
unanticipated, unusual, or striking.  I say this even though I 
disfavored lengthening the copyright term.  Like so many others, I 
was convinced that it could hardly enhance consumer welfare and 
promote science and the useful arts by impoverishing the public 
domain of thousands of works.  My hunch is that the public’s ability 
to freely access these works outweighs whatever incentive the 
copyright monopoly might give to the copyright owner to distribute 
the work.  The Court, however, found it sufficient that Congress 
“rationally credited projections that longer terms would encourage 
copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public 
 
 21. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204. 
 22. Id. at 208. 
 23. Id. at 222. 
 24. Id. at 188. 
 25. Id. 
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distribution of their works.”26 
It is hard for me to fault the Court for deferring to Congress.  
Evaluating the costs and benefits of term extension—that is, how to 
promote science and the useful arts—is an appropriate 
determination for Congress within its role as policy maker.  
However, I am skeptical that the twenty-year extension will create 
or save a significant number of jobs for our copyright industries.  I 
would like to see a study performed to determine the effect the 
CTEA has on jobs; but even if one comes about, it might raise more 
questions than it answers.  It would be a worthwhile project, but I 
suspect we will never know the full effects of the term extension 
because such empirical determinations are inherently 
indeterminate. 
In short, Congress has wide latitude in determining what kind 
of “progress” it is trying to promote when it passes copyright 
legislation.  The petitioners did not think that the CTEA was the 
best way to promote progress, and I agree.  As stated above, 
however, one can just as easily argue that conferring more rights 
will promote the distribution of works.  In other words, term 
extension may provide a useful subsidy for the efficient 
management of property rights.  Ultimately, no universally 
recognized definition of progress exists.  The meaning of 
“progress” is inherently contingent.  To adopt some fixed meaning 
of “progress” would signal, at least in the copyright domain, a 
return to a Lochnerian regime of economic substantive due 
process that defined important aspects of constitutional law in the 
first third of the twentieth century.27 
Looking farther out, what will happen in anticipation of 2019, 
when the twenty-year extension will expire on the oldest currently 
protected works?  Will Congress provide another extension, a 
CTEA II, substantiating the worst fears of those who believe the 
1998 amendments are the first in a series leading to an ultimate 
term of eternity minus one day?  Or as one might express it: 
“perpetual copyright term ‘on the installment plan’ ”?28  This was a 
position taken by petitioners in Eldred.29  Their argument can be 
characterized as follows: Once Congress has granted a term of 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 
2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 33, 67-68 (2003). 
 28. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 9, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 34092017 (2001). 
 29. Id. 
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copyright, Congress is prohibited from extending the term of 
copyright.  To do so would constitute a violation of the “limited 
Times” provision of Article I.  Of course, a twenty-year extension is 
limited to twenty years.  As William Patry explains, this logical 
reality forced petitioners to argue the term extension was not 
unconstitutional in itself but rather unconstitutional as one of an 
infinite series of future extensions.30  Such arguments about the 
future behavior of Congress carry little weight convincing a court to 
strike down legislation.31 
I do not share the fears of many of my copyright colleagues 
who believe that we have just seen the beginning of many 
promiscuous term extensions.32  I think the opposite.  My 
prediction is that this will be the last extension, unless, of course 
the European Union decides to extend their copyrights.  If the 
European Union would extend its copyright protection to, let’s say, 
life plus ninety years, and the United States Congress followed suit, 
I can see no rational basis for the Court to strike down such 
legislation.  Thus, the legislative problem may have to be solved by 
legislative determination. 
Actually, there is an elegant legislative solution to the 
copyright term dilemma that I think would maximize consumer 
welfare without, perhaps, unduly offending the needs of those who 
advocate the extended term.  As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, 
the Congressional Research Service study prepared for this case 
indicates that only “2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years old 
retain commercial value.”33  Moreover, it is usually impracticable to 
identify, much less find, authors of old works.  And, of course, in 
instances where one can do so, the transaction costs may be 
prohibitive for creators of new intellectual property to acquire 
licenses.34  To liberate those works that no longer have value to the 
copyright owner, Congress should impose a copyright maintenance 
fee every year up to the twentieth year of the extended term.35  One 
 
 30. William Patry, The United States and International Copyright Law: From Berne 
to Eldred, 40 HOUS. L. REV.  749, 758 (2003). 
 31. See id.; William Patry, Court Takes Hands Off Approach on Copyrights, NEW 
YORK L. J., May 12, 2003. 
 32. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of 
Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 81-82 (Fall 2002) (discussing 
unlimited extension of copyright duration under the CTEA). 
 33. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248. 
 34. Id. at 250. 
 35. See Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. § 3(c) 
(2003); http://www.eldred.cc (a web site for the Public Domain Enhancement Act 
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could even take a page from patent law and progressively increase 
the maintenance fee every year until twenty years ends.36 
I believe this is the best congressional solution to the public 
domain and one that is more feasible from a practical and political 
standpoint than the solution that Landes and Posner propose: 
infinitely renewable copyrights as measured from the beginning of 
the copyright term.37  The Landes and Posner plan would 
necessarily entail the renegotiation of the TRIPS agreement and a 
withdrawal from the Berne Convention, an unimaginably 
intolerable price to pay in the creation of an economically efficient 
system for managing copyright duration.  A copyright maintenance 
system as outlined above—one applied to the extended twenty-year 
period only—while not a panacea to public domain publishers, 
would avoid some of the deadweight loss that the term extension 
has imposed on the market for copyrighted works.  It would do so 
without creating havoc with our international copyright relations. 
What effect will the Court’s deferential attitude have on the 
critical copyright issues of our day?  Eldred does not bode well for 
those who would challenge the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA)38 on constitutional grounds.  If the striking deference that 
the Court confers on Congress is here to stay, the focus should be 
directed to the legislative stage where concessions may be garnered 
to ameliorate the more offensive aspects of the particular bill at 
issue.  In other words, once the legislation is passed, do not look to 
the courts to bail you out.  Indeed, the courts have in only one 
instance declared that a copyright bill was unconstitutional.39 
 
B.  Eldred and the First Amendment 
In my opinion, the First Amendment issue in Eldred ultimately 
 
movement which seeks to move unused copyrighted work into the public domain) 
(last visited July 8, 2004). The PDEA would require a copyright holder to pay a $1 
renewal fee fifty years after his work is first published, and  every ten years after 
until the end of the copyright term. 
 36. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2000) (defining progressive rate structure for 
patent maintenance fees). 
 37. See William M. Landes & Richard R. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 518 (2003). 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (2000). 
 39. United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. 829 F.2d 1152, 
1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invalidating Private Law 92-60, 85 Stat. 857 (1971) on 
establishment of religion grounds.) 
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may have more impact on the future of copyright law than the 
Court’s status quo, inherently deferential reading of Article I.  That 
said, though the petitioner lost as well on this issue, what Justice 
Ginsberg said about the interplay of copyright and the First 
Amendment indicates real constraints on the scope of copyright 
law. 
On the First Amendment issue, the majority agreed with the 
government’s position that the “speech-protective purposes and 
safeguards” embodied in copyright law were sufficient to preclude 
any heightened scrutiny of copyright legislation.40  In that regard, 
the Court referred to the idea/expression in § 102(b),41 and § 107’s 
fair use doctrine42 as part of the definitional balance that retains a 
free marketplace of ideas while protecting the author’s original 
expression.  In conclusion, the majority declared: “The CTEA . . . 
does not oblige anyone to reproduce another’s speech against the 
carrier’s will . . . .  The First Amendment securely protects the 
freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears 
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s 
speeches.”43  Thus, copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards are 
generally adequate to address them. Significantly, the Court added 
that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights 
“categorically immune from challenges under the First 
Amendment.”44  “But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered 
the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First 
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”45 
These remarks about the relationship between copyright law 
and the First Amendment are apt to have an influence beyond the 
narrow issue of term extension.  They may be the most important 
feature of the Court’s opinion on future developments in copyright 
law.  When does legislation alter those “traditional contours?”  In 
this regard, one might refer to the decision in Universal Studios, Inc. 
v. Corley.46  In Corley, the editors of a web site published the 
hyperlinks to other web sites making available a program, the so-
called DeCSS code, that could be used to crack the motion picture 
 
 40. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-19. 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 42. Id.  § 107. 
 43. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 44. Id. (citation omitted). 
 45. Id. (citations omitted) 
 46. 273 F.3d. 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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industry’s DVD anti-copying security software.47  In holding that 
such conduct violated § 1201(c) of the DMCA,48 the Court of 
Appeals deferred to Congress’s authority to enact prohibitions 
against making available the means to circumvent technological 
measures designed to protect copyrighted works against 
unauthorized access and use.49  It read § 1201(c) of the DMCA 
narrowly, holding that the provision preserves fair use in the 
context of traditional copyright infringement litigation but not for 
independent causes of action brought under the DMCA.50  The 
Court found that the legislation imposed no undue burdens on the 
First Amendment interests of individuals who communicate about 
computer code.51  Neither the statute nor, as far as I know, the 
legislative history addresses the linking issue; nonetheless, the court 
interpreted the law to afford full relief against the harms at which 
the statute was intended.52  The Corley court, however, declined 
consideration on the record of whether enforcement of the anti-
circumvention provisions might improperly encumber the “fair 
use” rights of third parties.53 
For proponents of a wider public domain, Eldred was a loss at 
least for the question of term extension.  They will no doubt find 
some support in their position from Justice Ginsberg’s statements 
regarding the role of fair use in the overall scheme of copyright.  I 
look for public domain proponents to accelerate their efforts on 
this issue. 
 
II. NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. TASINI: 
THE MEANING OF MEDIA NEUTRALITY 
New York Times Co. v. Tasini,54 decided some two years before 
Eldred, spoke to a relatively narrow and technical issue under § 
201(c) of the Copyright Act.55  This section of the Act allows 
publishers of “collective works,” such as newspapers and magazines, 
the right to republish the material supplied by freelance 
 
 47. Id. at 445-46. 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2000). 
 49. Universal Studios, Inc, 273 F.3d at 458. 
 50. Id. at 458-59. 
 51. Id. at 455. 
 52. Id. at 458. 
 53. Id. at 458-59. 
 54. 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000). 
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contributors in “revisions” of those collective works.56  Even though 
Tasini did not receive the universal ballyhoo of Eldred, it is an 
important decision because the Court gave its first indication of 
how it will apply traditional copyright principles to disputes 
involving digital information technologies.  The Court rejected the 
argument that unforeseen technological developments call for 
specifically crafted approaches to interpretations of the Copyright 
Act.57 
This litigation was initiated by Tasini and other freelance 
writers who contributed articles to the New York Times and other 
publishers.58  Under agreements with the periodicals’ publishers, 
two computer database companies placed copies of the freelancers’ 
articles—along with all other articles from the periodicals in which 
the freelancers’ work appeared—in three databases.59  In this 
format, the user could retrieve each article individually, clear of the 
context in which the article appeared in print publication.60  In 
other words, the user entered a search query based on key words, 
which would then be retrieved by the search engine. 
The question presented was whether a publisher’s 
reproduction and distribution of its entire periodical, not only in 
print but also electronically, is a privileged revision of a collective 
work under § 201(c) of the Copyright Act.61  The Act provides in 
part: 
In the absence of an express transfer of the 
copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of 
copyright in the collective work is presumed to have 
acquired only the privilege of reproducing and 
distributing the contribution as part of that 
particular collective work, any revision of that 
collective work, and any later collective work in the 
same series.62 
Justice Ginsberg, writing for the same 7-2 Eldred majority 
(Breyer and Stevens dissenting), rejected the publisher’s argument 
that databases are analogous to microfilm and microfiche.63  Unlike 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505-06. 
 58. Id. at 483. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 487. 
 62. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000). 
 63. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 485-86. 
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microforms, the databases at issue did not perceptibly reproduce 
articles as part of the collective work to which the author 
contributed or as part of any revision thereof.64  Nor was the Court 
persuaded by publishers’ reliance on the concept of media-
neutrality in contending that transferring a work between media 
does not alter the character of the work.65  Unlike the conversion of 
newsprint to microfilm, the transfer of articles to the databases is 
not a mere conversion of intact periodicals or revisions from one 
medium to another.66  Rather, the databases offer users individual 
articles, not intact periodicals.67  The Court repeatedly returned to 
the way the files are perceived and accessed by end users “[i]n 
determining whether the Articles have been reproduced and 
distributed ‘as part of’ a ‘revision’ of the collective works in issue, 
we focus on the Articles as presented to, and perceptible by, the 
user of the Databases.”68 
As to remedy, the Court remanded the case without explicit 
guidance.69  The court discounted the publisher’s predictions of 
the devastating consequences that would result from an 
injunction.70  Justice Ginsberg concluded “[i]n any event, 
speculation about future harms is no basis for this Court to shrink 
authorial rights Congress established in § 201(c).  Agreeing with 
the Court of Appeals that the Publishers are liable for 
infringement, we leave remedial issues open for initial airing and 
decision in the District Court.”71 
As in Eldred, Justices Stevens and Breyer sharply disagreed with 
the majority’s statutory analysis, concluding that the databases were 
in fact revisions under § 201(c).72  Justice Stevens reasoned that if a 
single edition of the New York Times were stored as ASCII files on a 
floppy disk, preserving the “all-important editorial selection,” the 
dissent would hold such a collection of files to be a “revision” of 
that collective work, if not “that collective work” itself.73  “[A]s long 
as each article explicitly refers to the original collective work and as 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 486. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 499. 
 69. Id. at 506. 
 70. Id. at 504-05. 
 71. Id. at 505-06. 
 72. Id. at 506. (Stevens & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 514-16. 
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long as substantially the rest of the collective work is, at the same 
time, readily accessible to the reader of the individual file,” there 
should be no difference between a print version and an electronic 
version of a single daily paper.74  The dissent retraced the evolution 
of § 201(c) from the relevant sections of the 1909 Act, asserting 
that the majority decision gave insufficient weight to the public 
benefit provided by the databases, and thus “unnecessarily subverts 
this fundamental goal of copyright law in favor of a narrow focus 
on ‘authorial rights.’ ”75 
The majority’s holding in Tasini is troublesome even though, 
from a purely doctrinal standpoint, I agree with the Court’s 
interpretation of § 201(c).  To hold otherwise would distort the 
wording of the statute to achieve a result that would keep the status 
quo and not distort the current distribution of articles already 
available to consumers.  However correct Tasini may be from a 
doctrinal standpoint, it has proved to be an unmitigated disaster 
from a societal standpoint.76 
At first blush, the Supreme Court’s decision appears to be a 
nice victory for freelance journalists.  On closer inspection, it 
hardly accommodates anyone.  One might conclude that the 
freelancers won the battle but lost the war.  What happened is this: 
In the 1990s, with the Tasini case looming, publishers (like the New 
York Times Co.) became fully aware of the possible liability risk and 
began insisting on “all rights” agreements designed to allow 
publishers to reuse freelancers’ contributions.77  The contracts are 
standard now, but it is not clear whether freelancers were able to 
extract larger profits in negotiating these agreements.  After all, 
media outlets for freelance articles have continued to consolidate 
so that publishers are now virtual oligopolies.  The market is now a 
buyer’s market: “You want to write an article for us, sign over the 
rights.”  Thus, the freelancers earned a modest one-time windfall at 
best. 
If the freelancers earned an ambiguous victory, and the 
publishers suffered an ambiguous loss, what about the public 
interest in access to information?  Here is where the story gets 
 
 74. Id. at 514. 
 75. Id. at 520. 
 76. See Experts Weigh Tasini Ruling’s Impact on Freelancers and Electronic 
Publishing, 62 BNA’S PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 557 (2001) (reporting on 
a briefing that discussed Tasini and its consequences). 
 77. Id. 
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depressing.  The public appears to have lost unambiguously.  In the 
aftermath of Tasini, many newspapers and other print media, 
uncertain as to which archived articles were written by freelancers, 
have resorted to overly inclusive purges to avoid liability.  
Consequently, a researcher who wants access to a certain article 
may not be able to go online to obtain it and, in turn, is forced to 
find a library that keeps paper (or microfiche) copies of the 
publication. 
So what has Tasini accomplished outside of a reasoned 
interpretation of § 201(c) and rather unfortunate practical 
results?78  One thing stands out.  Tasini is a pro-author decision that 
reconfirms the basic policy that individual creation, encouraged by 
the incentives of copyright law, benefits the public interest.  After 
all, it was concern about the unfair situation of periodical 
contributors that motivated Congress to structure § 201(c) as it 
did.79  Some might take pleasure in the fact that the beneficiaries of 
this pro-author attitude were real live creators rather than the 
“content providing” corporate entities. 
In addition to reaffirming the pro-author basis of § 201, Tasini, 
more importantly, articulates a certain attitude in the application 
of copyright law to digital issues.  In my view, the case stands for 
one version of “media neutrality,” the idea that courts should 
interpret copyright law in a technologically neutral fashion.  In 
applying § 201(c), the Court focused on consumers’ perceptions to 
determine what constituted a qualifying “revision” of a periodical, 
rather than on the technology’s characteristics itself.  In so doing, it 
rejected the notion that digital issues are somehow different than 
others, a position adopted in part by the dissenters.  What this 
means is that the digital condition is not so overwhelmingly 
singular to justify the abrogation of traditional copyright principles. 
What does this view of “media neutrality” hold for the future of 
copyright law?  Although Tasini is an author’s rights case, its 
implicit approach to media neutrality might result in applying the 
doctrine of fair use in a technologically neutral manner, even 
though the user may have accessed a work residing in digital format 
 
 78. For an analysis of the legislative history concerning § 201 see William 
Patry, New York Times v. Tasini: Call for Common (Not Horse) Sense, 61 BNA’S PATENT 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., No. 602 (2001). 
 79. Often in United States copyright law the notion of authorship is pressed 
into service to benefit corporate entities rather than individual creators. See Peter 
Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L. 
J. 455 (1991). 
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and despite the argument that such use might cause greater risks to 
the copyright owner.  To this extent, Tasini’s version of media 
neutrality, read in conjunction with Eldred’s reaffirmation of fair use 
in its First Amendment discussion, may bode well for advocates of a 
more vibrant public domain. 
From an immediate standpoint, Tasini has already had an 
impact on the development of the law under § 201(c).  In Faulkner 
v. National Geographic Society,80 the district court for the Southern 
District of New York held that the use of freelancers’ photographs 
in CD-ROM versions of National Geographic magazine was a 
privileged revision of the print publication, not an infringement of 
the freelancers’ copyright in their contributions.81  The Faulkner 
case runs counter to Greenberg v. National Geographic Society,82 a pre-
Tasini decision, that found no revision privilege in favor of the 
magazine under the same facts.  The Faulkner court emphasized the 
fact that the individual contributions appeared in the same 
contexts as they did in the original collective work.83 
 
III. DASTAR V. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP.: 
RIGHT OF PATERNITY 
One could challenge my characterization of Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.84 as a copyright case and in some 
ways I would agree.  After all, Dastar concerns the application of 
unfair competition in an unusual context.  I include it in my 
discussion because it does reflect the interplay between the 
Commerce and Copyright clauses of the Constitution, the 
protection of moral rights, and more generally, the Court’s current 
attitude about the role of public domain. 
In 1948, General Dwight D. Eisenhower completed his book, 
Crusade in Europe, an account of the Allied crusade of Europe.85  
The publisher, Doubleday, registered the copyright and granted 
exclusive TV rights to Fox.86  Fox commissioned Time to produce a 
 
 80. 294 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 81. Id. at 544-46. 
 82. 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) 
 83. Faulkner, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 543. 
 84. 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003). 
 85. Id. at 2044. 
 86. Id. 
15
Leaffer: Life after Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of Copyright
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
LEAFFER-FORMATTED 7/20/2004  6:22:54 PM 
1612 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:5 
TV series, based on the book, which was first broadcast in 1949.87  
Time assigned its copyright in the series to Fox.88  Doubleday 
renewed its copyright in the book.89  Fox did not renew its 
copyright in the TV series, which expired in 1977.90  In 1988, Fox 
reacquired television rights in the book, including the exclusive 
right to distribute the videos.91  It then sublicensed to SFM 
Entertainment and New Line Video the right to produce and 
distribute a video set.92  In 1995, Dastar copied the original TV 
series, removed the credits, repackaged the set, and released its 
own video product under the credit “DASTAR CORP presents.”93  
Fox, SFM, and New Line filed suit alleging copyright infringement 
and violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and state unfair 
competition law for “reverse passing off.”94  The district court 
granted summary judgment to Fox on both the copyright and 
“reverse passing off claim.”95  It found that Dastar had committed a 
“bodily appropriation” by substantially copying the series and 
selling it without attribution to Fox.96  The Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded on the copyright infringement claim, but 
affirmed the claim for “reverse passing off.”97  The court found that 
Dastar made a “false designation of origin” in violation of 
trademark law and the “bodily appropriation test” precluded any 
need to show consumer confusion.98 
Some court watchers were intrigued, even surprised, that the 
Supreme Court took the case at all.  Were the justices looking for a 
way to counterbalance the Eldred opinion that the Copyright Term 
Extension Act was constitutional?  I do not think we should read 
too much into this.  As fascinating as Dastar is, the case is not based 
on the application of the constitutional clause, as Eldred was.  It 
could have been otherwise.  For example, the Court could have 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 2044-45. 
 95. Id. at 2045. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 34 Fed. Appx. 312, 
314 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003). 
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found that the Commerce Clause cannot be used to circumvent the 
Copyright Clause.  In the end it took a more modest approach to 
the question. 
The Court chose instead to base its decision by construing the 
scope of § 43 of the Lanham Act.99  It did so, however, in an 
unexpected way.  When the court granted certiorari, I thought that 
the Court would follow in the footsteps of Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret 
Catalogue, Inc.100 and require proof of actual confusion before 
sustaining action for reverse confusion.  In fact, the opinion is 
much more expansive and has ramifications beyond trademark law.  
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Court of 
Appeals, which held that the Lanham Act does not prevent the 
unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted work.101  The Court 
concluded that the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act 
“refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for 
sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication 
embodied in those goods . . . .  To hold otherwise would be akin to 
finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and 
copyright, which Congress may not do.”102 
The Court based its rationale on the difference between the 
standard definitions of “goods” and “origins” and determined that 
those terms did not cover the underlying intellectual property or its 
creators.103  By contrast, the action could be sustained if Dastar had 
bought some of New Line’s Crusade videotapes and merely 
repackaged them as its own.104  Instead Dastar took a creative work 
in the public domain, copied it, made modifications, and produced 
its own series of videotapes.105  Thus, Dastar was the origin of the 
physical products it sold as its own, and as such, the respondents 
could not prevail on its Lanham Act claims.106 
The question is: What constitutes “origin”?  Does it refer to the 
manufacturer or the producer of physical goods, or does it refer to 
the creator of the underlying work?  The Court concluded that 
 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
 100. 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 101. Dastar Corp., 123 S. Ct. at 2041.  Justice Breyer took no part in either 
consideration or decision of the case. 
 102. Id. at 2050 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003)). 
 103. Id. at 2049-50. 
 104. Id. at 2050. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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“origin” refers to the former.107  Consumers who buy brand-name 
products do not automatically assume that the brand-name 
company is the entity that came up with or designed the product.  
In general, consumers do not care what entity designed the 
product they are purchasing.  In other words, consumers may care 
who manufactured the product, but do not care who created it.  To 
conclude otherwise, the Court asserted, would cause a conflict with 
copyright law, which grants the public the right to copy without 
attribution once a copyright has expired.108 
I personally take issue with Justice Scalia’s conclusion as to 
what purchasers care about when it comes to the origin of goods.  
As for myself, I am particularly interested in knowing the author’s 
name and I suspect many others hold a similar view.  I do not agree 
that a § 43(a) right of paternity in the appropriate circumstance 
after the expiration of copyright would create an inherent conflict 
with copyright law.  Such a rule would not prevent copying of the 
copyrighted work with impunity.  Thus, I fail to see how the 
requirement to acknowledge authorship would be that onerous 
and would improperly extend copyright. 
Justice Scalia also asserted that the § 43(a) cause of action 
would conflict with copyright law in another way.  He reasoned that 
Congress has already created a specific paternity right in the Visual 
Artists Rights Act (VARA) codified in § 106A of the Copyright 
Act.109  VARA provides the author of a qualifying artistic work the 
right “to claim authorship of that work.”110  Justice Scalia pointed 
out the VARA paternity right is much more focused than a more 
generalized right under the Lanham Act.111  Thus, to recognize “a 
cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of 
noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) would render these 
limitations superfluous.”112 
This is a striking statement for two reasons.  One is factual.  I 
fail to see how a more generalized right of paternity under federal 
unfair competition law would render VARA superfluous.  Certainly, 
Congress gave no indication that VARA was intended to supersede 
the protection of paternity interests upheld in the application of 
 
 107. Id. at 2049-50. 
 108. Id. at 2050. 
 109. Id. at 2048. 
 110. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 111. Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2048. 
 112. Id. 
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§ 43(a).  Second, and more importantly, the statement seems to 
give short shrift to United States obligations under the Berne 
Convention requiring that authors be provided the rights of 
paternity and integrity.113  Did the Court forget that the 
requirement of moral rights protections was a major obstacle for 
United States participation in the Berne Convention?  For the 
United States, the moral rights issue was, to put it mildly, an 
inconvenient aspect of Berne.  At the time of the passage of the 
Berne Convention Implementation Act, it was generally recognized 
that the passage of a full-fledged moral rights provision in the 
copyright law would have been a political impossibility.  Thus, the 
United States, to save face, took a minimalist position on moral 
rights.  In other words, it skirted the issue, maintaining that the 
entirety of United States law including unfair competition, 
defamation, privacy, and contract, in addition to copyright law, 
provided effective protection of moral rights.114  Dastar goes far in 
undermining whatever illusion is left of the minimalist argument. 
In addition to ignoring the Berne requirements, Dastar also 
avoided an important and controversial issue concerning legislative 
authority in the field of intellectual property law.  Can the Congress 
evade constraints placed on it by the Copyright Clause by basing a 
statutory enactment in another grant of power, such as the 
Commerce Clause?  This issue has particular importance in debates 
over the proposed sui generis database protection legislation.115  
Database owners assert that they need such legislation to protect 
their investment in the development of their informational 
product, particularly in the digital environment.  The pervasive 
question is whether such sui generis legislation is constitutional in 
light of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,116 which 
precluded copyright protection for facts per se, irrespective of the 
amount of effort made generating or assembling them.  Under 
Feist, a database is protectable only to the extent that it manifests 
originality as to its selection and arrangement.117 
 
 113. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as 
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 (Paris Act), art. 6bis, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo001en.htm (last visited July 8, 2004). 
 114. The Berne Implementation Act of 1988 § 2(3), Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 
Stat. 2853 (1988). 
 115. See, e.g., The Databases and Collections of Information Misappropriations 
Act, H.R. 3261(introduced Oct. 8, 2003). 
 116. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 117. Id. at 363-64. 
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Some might view the Court’s holding that the Lanham 
Trademark Act could not override the durational limitation 
expressed in the Copyright Clause as answering in the negative the 
question whether legislation, designed to avoid the constitutionally 
mandated requirement of originality declared in its landmark Feist 
case, can constitutionally be enacted under the Commerce Clause.  
My guess is that the Court did not have this in mind when it issued 
its opinion.  But Dastar will no doubt provide some ammunition to 
public domain advocates who would find the data proposals lacking 




In my opinion, the Court’s record on its millennium copyright 
decisions is mixed.  As for Eldred, while the term extension may be 
bad from a policy standpoint, I relate to Justice Ginsberg’s careful 
and thoughtful opinion despite what some might view as its 
excessive deference to the Congress on the issue.  And perhaps 
more important for the future of copyright is the Court’s 
reaffirmation that the fair use doctrine enables copyright to pass 
muster under the First Amendment. 
Similarly for Tasini, the Court got it right from a doctrinal 
standpoint, even though the ultimate result of the holding led to 
some unfortunate results in the information marketplace.  On the 
other hand, public domain advocates may take heart in the Court’s 
refusal to adopt a position of “digital exceptionalism.”  Thus, when 
the time comes to apply the doctrine of fair use in the appropriate 
case, anti-DMCA forces may be pleasantly surprised and take 
sustenance from the view expressed that just because you call 
something “digital,” that does not rule out the traditional 
limitations and balances embedded in copyright law.  Finally, I 
agree with the holding in Dastar but find its rationale less 
appealing. 
What does all this mean for public domain advocates?  Only 
time will tell.  But I will say this, particularly to those who 
optimistically believed that the Court was poised to overturn the 
term extension: The future may be grey, but it is certainly not 
black. Indeed, in their own quirky way, Eldred, Tasini, and Dastar 
may prove to be the key in reaffirming the traditional checks and 
balances of copyright law. 
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